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AN OVERVIEW OF NEW YORK’S 





Although many of us lovingly declare, “Until death do us 
part” on our wedding day, should we instead utter the caveat, “or at 
least until one of us declares this marriage to have irretrievably bro-
ken down?”1  Perhaps this is an absurd measure and certainly not one 
likely to garner much popularity, but in a way, such sentiment is a 
potential reality for many married couples.  With nearly half of all 
first time marriages ending in divorce,2 there is no wonder that legal 
reform in the area of domestic relations law has recently taken the 
State of New York by storm.  Beginning October 12, 2010, with the 
implementation of no-fault divorce3 and continuing in July 2011 with 
the enactment of the Marriage Equality Act,4 New York gave a 
 
                                                                                                                                       
* J.D. Candidate 2013, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. 2009, State 
University of New York at Stony Brook.  Special Thanks: To Associate Dean Myra Berman, 
Professor Rena Seplowitz, Professor Daniel Subotnik, and the members of the Touro Law 
Review for their time, diligent efforts, and assistance with the editing of this comment.  To 
my Editor-In-Chief, Tiffany Frigenti, for her support, friendship, and unrivaled leadership 
throughout this process.  To my brothers and sister, whom I hope to inspire in their own re-
spective endeavors.  To Erik Howard, a constant source of inspiration in my work, for his 
compassion and unwavering understanding of my drive and dedication.  And to my parents, 
who have encouraged me from day one to pursue my life’s desires and obtain the unobtaina-
ble.  I thank you all from the bottom of my heart. 
1 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7) (McKinney 2010) (listing the seventh ground for di-
vorce as “[t]he relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably”). 
2 See U.S. Census Report, Tbl.1336. Marriage and Divorce Rates by Country: 1980-2008 
at 840, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2008), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/ 
11s1335.pdf (showing the divorce rates in the United States for the year 2008). 
3 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7). 
4 Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Law News of N.Y. (McKinney) (codi-
fied as amended N.Y. DOM. REL. §§ 10-a, 10-b, 11, 13 (effective July 24, 2011)). 
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much-needed makeover to its domestic relations laws (“DRL”),5 
which govern the parameters of marriage and divorce in the Empire 
State.6 
The connection linking New York’s passage of no-fault di-
vorce and the Marriage Equality Act is that both play a paramount 
role in what has become a modern wave of divorce reform.7  The 
birth of this reformation in New York State commenced in 1966 with 
the addition of three new grounds for divorce, which joined the pre-
vious sole ground of adultery.8  While the majority of the other forty-
nine states were experiencing a “divorce revolution”9 in the 1970s 
and 1980s through their adoption of the no-fault system, New York 
held steadfast to its contentious, fault-based grounds for divorce.10  
Ostensibly, there was no end in sight for the fault versus no-fault 
standoff.  Then, after much debate and encouragement from matri-
monial attorneys and judges who called for reform to the existing 
domestic relations laws,11 this modern wave of change commenced 
with the adoption of no-fault.  Thereafter, divorce reformation gained 
additional momentum with the legalization of same-sex marriage as 
provided for by the Marriage Equality Act.12 
Remarkably, New York was the final state to adopt the no-
fault system, which signaled a momentous departure from its 
 
                                                                                                                                       
5 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW (McKinney 2012). 
6 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (governing actions for divorce); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 
10-a (governing same-sex marriages). 
7 See David Paul Horowitz, Breaking up is [Easier] to Do, N.Y. ST. B.J. 18, 18 (2010) 
(discussing the new divorce law). 
8 Joel Stashenko, Those Eager to be “Ex-Spouse” Embrace No-Fault, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 13, 
2010, at 1. 
9 See LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA xvii (1985) (arguing that 
there were three components to the “divorce revolution:” “The soaring divorce rate and the 
widespread adoption of no-fault divorce laws, . . . [and] the changing social context of di-
vorce which is reflected in both attitudes and behavior”). 
10 See J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform has 
Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 567 (2007) (“By the late 19th century, New 
Yorkers were well-acquainted with the fact that other jurisdictions offered easier access to 
marital dissolution.”). 
11 See, e.g., Matrimonial Commission, Report to Chief Judge of the State of New York 18 
(Feb. 2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reports/matrimonialcommissionreport.pdf 
(stating that no-fault divorce was a necessary and recommended reform to the fault-based 
system). 
12 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2012). 
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longstanding and notorious relationship with fault-based divorce 
law.13  Under the new legislation, parties may dissolve their marriage 
so long as one malcontented spouse alleges under oath that the par-
ties’ marriage has “broken down irretrievably for a period of at least 
six months.”14  A divorce will thereafter be granted so long as all of 
the parties’ economic issues, child custody and/or visitation arrange-
ments have been settled through either legal agreement or the incor-
poration of such issues into the parties’ judgment of divorce.15 
Prior to the advent of no-fault, the aptly named fault-based 
divorce system initially demanded that at least one of the parties al-
lege some wrongdoing against his or her spouse that would constitute 
a statutorily valid ground for divorce.16  Because spousal transgres-
sion was often required for divorce under the old domestic relations 
law, even couples who desired to part ways on cordial terms were 
forced to “participate in the ritual of proving one partner’s fault.”17 
Preceding the enactment of no-fault, New York’s last signifi-
cant change took place in 1966, nearly half a century earlier, when 
the legislature incorporated additional grounds for divorce: aban-
donment, imprisonment of a spouse in excess of three years, cruel 
and inhuman treatment, and living separately and apart from one’s 
spouse for a period, originally, of two or more years18 pursuant to a 
separation agreement.19  However, from 1787 until the 1966 amend-
 
                                                                                                                                       
13 Stashenko, supra note 8. 
14 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(7). 
15 Id. 
16 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1)–(5) (explaining the fault provisions which continue 
to be in existence for those parties that may not qualify for no-fault divorce, for example, a 
couple seeking a divorce after three months of marriage will not meet the requisite six month 
period of irretrievable breakdown).  But cf. Maurer v. Maurer, 42 P.2d 186, 187 (Or. 1935) 
(holding in a rather extreme fashion, that neither husband nor wife entered the court with 
“clean hands” because each had committed marital misconduct, and therefore, neither should 
be granted a divorce). 
17 See WEITZMAN, supra note 9, at 9. 
18 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5) (indicating that spouses now only need to live apart 
for a period of one year in order to seek a divorce under this subsection). 
19 See Stashenko, supra note 8 (explaining that New York was the last state to adopt no-
fault divorce, and that the first major modification to divorce laws in the state only occurred 
in 1966, with the addition of new grounds to the sole ground of adultery); see also Lauren 
Guidice, New York and Divorce: Finding Fault in a No Fault System, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 787, 
799-800 (2011) (explaining that this was technically New York’s first form of a no-fault di-
vorce provision under the “conversion divorce,” wherein one party could petition the court to 
convert the separation agreement into a judgment of divorce). 
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ment, adultery was the lone ground for divorce.20  Presumably, adul-
tery was the exclusive ground for divorce for so long because physi-
cal and emotional betrayal is one of the most contemptible marital 
transgressions.21  However, the primary reason that adultery reigned 
supreme was because it offered a method of control for the more con-
servative groups and legislators who sought to make the process of 
obtaining a divorce difficult in an effort to reinforce the sanctity of 
the institution of marriage.22  Not only is adultery considered to be 
the ultimate act of spousal misconduct, but it is also one of the most 
difficult to prove.23  With the imposition of a mere four grounds for 
divorce,24 many married couples’ desire to dissolve the marriage was 
stifled by the reality that their marital woes did not quite fit into the 
mold for an action for divorce under the domestic relation laws as 
they stood.  This, too, was a method that some believed would keep 
divorce at bay; by only allowing the most serious spousal misconduct 
to result in dissolution of the bond of marriage, couples would be 
forced to reconsider their aspirations to separate.25 
However, the modern wave of reform continued to alter the 
status quo of the domestic relations law on July 24, 2011, when the 
Marriage Equality Act took effect.26  This ground breaking and su-
premely controversial legislation literally redefined marriage for New 
York State by rendering same-sex marriage a legally valid institu-
 
                                                                                                                                       
20 Stashenko, supra note 8. 
21 See WEITZMAN, supra note 9, at 4 (“Because adultery was considered such a clear viola-
tion of both moral and legal norms, it provided one of the earliest grounds for divorce.”). 
22 DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 10, at 560. 
23 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 255.30 (McKinney 2012).  Section 25.30(1) specifically states: 
A person shall not be convicted of adultery or of an attempt to commit 
adultery solely upon the testimony of the other party to the adulterous act 
or attempted act, unsupported by other evidence tending to establish that 
the defendant attempted to engage with the other party in sexual inter-
course, and that the defendant or the other party had a living spouse at 
the time of the adulterous act or attempted act. 
Id. 
24 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1)–(4) (listing the four grounds of divorce that existed 
prior to the enactment of no-fault). 
25 See WEITZMAN, supra note 9, at 7 (“Since the aim of the law was to preserve marriage 
as a lifelong union, divorce was restricted to situations in which one party committed a seri-
ous marital offense such as adultery, cruelty, or desertion, giving the other party the legal 
basis or ground for the divorce.”). 
26 Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Law News of N.Y. (McKinney) (codi-
fied as amended N.Y. DOM. REL. §§ 10-a, 10-b, 11, 13 (McKinney 2011)). 
4
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tion,27 something gay, lesbian, and transgendered couples’ heterosex-
ual counterparts have always had the unfettered right to enjoy.  With 
the passage of this legislative measure, New York became the fifth 
state to legalize same-sex marriage in the United States.28 
However, amidst all of the excitement and celebration sur-
rounding the enactment of the Marriage Equality Act as a progressive 
step for the State, one must also wonder what the implications will be 
for same-sex couples that later seek to terminate their marital rela-
tionship through divorce.  Although it may seem cynical to immedi-
ately ponder the ramifications of same-gender divorce in light of the 
historic legislation, the question must be asked: Will divorce impact 
gay spouses in the same fashion as it does heterosexual spouses?  
And more importantly, do the current divorce laws, as written, need 
to be further adapted to better accommodate and protect same-sex 
couples? 
Although reform has occurred at a rapid pace in New York in 
recent years, it is a bit peculiar that the State was the last to adopt the 
long established and widely accepted practice of no-fault divorce yet, 
is one of the pioneers in solemnizing same-sex marriage in the United 
States.29  Thus, there is a palpable dichotomy between the two do-
mestic relations laws.  On one hand, New York held onto the relic of 
fault-based divorce for an unusually long period of time, in part due 
to notions of marital sanctity and reinforcement of the traditional nu-
clear family.30  On the other hand, the State, after succumbing to the 
battle over no-fault divorce, quickly adopted a progressive social and 
legislative policy by validating the desire of same-sex couples to mar-
ry.31 
 
                                                                                                                                       
27 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a(1) (“A marriage that is otherwise valid shall be valid 
regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.”). 
28 The other jurisdictions that now permit same-sex marriages at the time of publication 
are: Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Ver-
mont, Washington, and the District of Columbia.  Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage 
Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-
services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
29 See id. (“Lawmakers voted . . . to legalize same-sex marriage, making New York the 
largest state where gay and lesbian couples will be able to wed and giving the national gay-
rights movement new momentum from the state where it was born.”). 
30 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nuclear%20family 
(last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (defining the nuclear family as “a family group that consists only 
of father, mother, and children”). 
31 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a; see also Alexandra Harwin, Ending the Alimony Guessing 
5
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These recent reformations to the domestic landscape have 
created an interesting juxtaposition in the State’s attempt to protect 
the underlying importance of family values, while accommodating 
society’s changing notions of what defines a family unit in today’s 
modern times.  With the advent of same-sex marriage, it appears that 
the vast majority of society, at least in New York, has reached the 
conclusion that the term “spouse” can no longer be narrowly con-
strued as “husband” and “wife” in the traditional male-female 
sense.32 
The fact that one may now marry a partner of the same sex 
and enjoy the benefits of the institution, does not, however, mean that 
the legislature’s work is done.  These recent changes have given rise 
to a host of new issues concerning whether the equality and fairness 
that was intended by both the no-fault law33 and Marriage Equality 
Act34 will truly be a reality for spouses seeking to break the marital 
bond under these newly adopted laws.  More specifically, Part II of 
this Comment will offer a brief history of divorce reform in New 
York.  Part III will consider whether eliminating the grounds re-
quirements under no-fault actually improves the divorce process by 
taking the sting out of the often contentious battle of the spouses.  In 
relation to same-sex divorce, this Comment, in Part IV, will address 
various disadvantages gay couples potentially face as they forge their 
way through the vast disparity between the state and federal law’s 
recognition of their union and how the parties’ assets may be impact-
ed in the event of divorce. 
Additionally, in the subsections following Part IV, this Com-
ment will examine the oppressive effect that the Defense of Marriage 
 
Game, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/04/opinion/04harwin.html 
 (noting the rapidity with which New York adopted same-sex marriage following the no-
fault divorce amendment); Danny Hakim, Republicans Appear on the Verge of at Least 
Sharing Control of the New York Senate, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/nyregion/04nylegis.html?_r=1 (explaining how Demo-
cratic leadership, beginning in 2008, paved the way for liberal-leaning policies concerning 
no-fault divorce and the proposal of the same-sex marriage enactment). 
32 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (stating that all gender-specific language shall be construed 
as gender neutral when implementing the rights and responsibilities of spouses). 
33 See, e.g., Stashenko, supra note 8 (stating the position of a former Justice of the New 
York Supreme Court Appellate Division that the new no-fault law will be successful in “its 
primary purpose: to avoid as much as possible the ‘misery and nastiness and expense and 
delay caused by having to find fault as a factor’ ”) (statement of Sondra M. Miller, a former 
Appellate Division Judge). 
34 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a (intending to make marriage fair for all sexes). 
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Act (“DOMA”)35 has on the State’s effort to oversee its domestic re-
lations laws and other issues concerning federalism and reciprocity.  
Since the ultimate results are yet to be realized during this period of 
transition in New York, it is the position of this Comment that no-
fault, although the prevailing method for divorce in the United States, 
will fall short of its intended goal to keep the acrimony out of divorce 
proceedings.  Irrespective of the concept of no-fault, the harsh reali-
ties of divorce and the need to “point the finger” will continue to play 
a role in divorce proceedings in New York.  Moreover, although the 
Marriage Equality Act is a step in the right direction to bringing 
about true marriage equality, it can be considered nothing more than 
a heartfelt gesture by the State until the federal Defense of Marriage 
Act is repealed.36  This is merely recognizing the unfortunate truth 
that so long as DOMA exists, same-sex marriages will not be legal 
equals to traditional marriages comprised of a husband and wife.  
This reality can only be remedied by increasingly protective laws that 
pay special heed to the tax implications that equitable distribution of 
the marital assets may have on same-sex spouses and, most im-
portantly, the parenting rights and best interests of the children from 
these marriages. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
35 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) [hereinafter DOMA].  Definition of “marriage” and “spouse” is 
stated as follows: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a hus-
band or a wife. 
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), which additionally states: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, 
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial pro-
ceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a re-
lationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage 
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a 
right or claim arising from such relationship. 
Id. 
36 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF DIVORCE REFORM AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE LAWS IN NEW 
YORK 
Before understanding where the law is headed under the re-
cent reforms, it is necessary to first look back to the history of di-
vorce in the twentieth century to determine how and why the domes-
tic relations law has evolved into its current state.  In the past, “The 
traditional law defined the basic rights and obligations of husbands 
and wives on the basis of gender, creating a sex-based division of 
family roles and responsibilities.”37  Thus, the new laws, based not in 
tradition, but rather in progression, will have to adapt to meet the 
needs that justice and society demand. 
Prior to 1970, all fifty states required some form of fault to es-
tablish the requisite grounds for a divorce.38  That all changed with 
the progressive action that California took in being the first to adopt a 
no-fault divorce system “in the Western World.”39  Thus the term 
“Divorce Revolution” was born from Lenore J. Weitzman, who stud-
ied the social and legal changes that took place in the wake of this 
unprecedented no-fault divorce legislation.40 
In taking a cue from California, nearly every other state had 
adopted some provision of no-fault into its version of the domestic 
relations laws by 1985.41  The relatively swift evolution from a nation 
focused on fault to a nation permitting less stringent divorce laws can 
only be explained by a general change in the country’s moral and so-
cial values.42  As society progressed in the twentieth century, so, too, 
did the notion that marriage was not the ultimate, unbreakable union 
that it was once thought to be.  Instead, many married couples were 
realizing that they wanted a way out of unhappy, lackluster relation-
ships that had faded over time.  Divorce, specifically no-fault di-
 
                                                                                                                                       
37 WEITZMAN, supra note 9, at 2. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at ix-x. 
41 Guidice, supra note 19, at 793. 
42 Id.; see also Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., History and Current Status of Divorce in the 
United States, 4 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 29, 34 (1994), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1602476 (remarking on the shift from the idealities of the 1950’s 
marriage to a society focused on “individual interests [and] away from forming permanent 
unions to more fluid and flexible arrangements”). 
8
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vorce, made the chances of future happiness more viable for those 
seeking to part ways with their once-beloved spouse.43  Thus, the 
popularity of the no-fault divorce system exponentially grew across 
the nation.44 
The fault-based system focused on the State’s interest in the 
preservation of marriage and the belief that the fault requirement, in-
cluding a spouse’s burden to prove such fault, would deter the disso-
lution of marriages.45  As society evolved, so did the common percep-
tions and stigmas that were typically coupled with the idea of divorce 
and those who chose to end their marriages through such means.46  
People began to accept divorce as a social norm and loosened the 
grips of the “social ostracism”47 that often burdened men and women 
who had experienced a failed marriage.48  The line between tradition-
al gender roles became less distinct as women entered the workplace 
by the masses.  Thus, a newfound emphasis of individualism and per-
sonal freedom became prevalent in society.49  Furthermore, the sexual 
revolution, which created new sexual norms, was changing the shape 
of relationships between men and women.50  As a result of all these 
societal changes, the fault system was rapidly losing its allure with 
state legislatures and constituents alike.51 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of no-fault by many of its fel-
low states, New York was firm in its stance on proving that the fault 
of the parties mattered.52  Perhaps New Yorkers needed to hold onto 
 
                                                                                                                                       
43 See W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, NATIONAL AFFAIRS, 81 (2009), 
http://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-evolution-of-divorce (“[W]hile less than 
20% of couples who married in 1950 ended up divorced, about 50% of couples who married 
in 1970 did.”). 
44 Id. 
45 Guidice, supra note 19, at 794. 
46 WEITZMAN, supra note 9, at xvii. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. (“Divorce has become recognized as a possibility for most American couples, 
and divorced men and women are no longer considered exceptional or deviant in most social 
circles.”). 
49 Id. at xviii. 
50 See Furstenberg, supra note 42 (“The sexual revolution in no small measure made mar-
riage seem less attractive.”). 
51 See id. (discussing the cultural changes that took place in the United States). 
52 See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 10, at 593 (“Various reasons have been cited for this 
reconsideration of blameworthiness, including ‘the growing evidence that divorce often hurts 
children, feminists’ renewed recognition of the importance of legal protection for mothers 
raising children, and concerns about the economic disparities created by differences in mar-
9
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the idea that someone was to blame in order to make sense of the in-
creased number of divorces that seemed to be affecting the entirety of 
the United States.53  Or, perhaps, the State was not sold on the idea 
that no-fault truly meant “no-fault” and, therefore, a modification to 
the law would not be worth the trouble of reformation.54  Whatever 
the cause may be, New York would not budge, and the four grounds 
for divorce continued to be alleged by disgruntled spouses across the 
State seeking a way out of their lifeless marriages.55 
It should be noted that out of the reforms from 1966, New 
York tested the no-fault water by adding what is known as the “con-
version divorce” into its domestic relations law.56  Although this con-
version form of divorce was not a true no-fault provision, it was the 
closest that New York would come to implementing no-fault for sev-
eral decades.57  Under this conversion form of divorce, the spouses 
must agree to live separate and apart for a specified period of time.58  
The requisite time period for separation ultimately decreased from 
 
riage rates.’ ”) (quoting Robin Fretwell Wilson, Don’t Let Divorce off the Hook, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 1, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/opinion/01LIwilson.html). 
53 See id. at 592–93 (“[T]he removal of fault from divorce throughout the nation has been 
criticized as an inappropriate erasure of culpability, thus muddying the moral message of 
marriage.”). 
54 See Joel Stashenko, Woman Wins Divorce After Trial in No-Fault Dispute, N.Y.L.J., 
Jan. 23, 2012.  In York State’s first contested no-fault divorce the defendant-husband assert-
ed certain affirmative defenses to counter the automatic granting of a judgment of divorce at 
the request of his wife.  Id.  Although the wife sought a divorce under the no-fault provision, 
she ultimately alleged various marital wrongdoings against her husband in an effort to obtain 
the divorce.  Id.  Justice James F. Quinn ultimately granted the parties a divorce, but noted 
the validity of the husband’s challenge, stating, “It is interesting to note that the legislature 
wanted to create a no-fault provision, but maintained all six other grounds for divorce in the 
statute . . . .  It appears that New York is a quasi-no-fault state based upon the availability of 
grounds, and no-fault provisions.”  Id. 
55 William M. Hohengarten, Same-Sex Marriage and the Right of Privacy, 103 YALE L.J. 
1495, 1515 (1994) (discussing the four fault based grounds for divorce in New York). 
56 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5) (“The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to 
a decree or judgment of separation . . . and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the 
plaintiff that he or she has substantially performed all the terms and conditions of such de-
cree or judgment.”) (emphasis added); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(6) (McKinney 2012) 
(“The husband and wife have lived separate and apart pursuant to a written agreement of 
separation . . . and satisfactory proof has been submitted by the plaintiff that he or she has 
substantially performed all the terms and conditions of such agreement.”) (emphasis added). 
57 Douglas Mossman & Amanda N. Shoemaker, Incompetence to Maintain a Divorce Ac-
tion: When Breaking up is Odd to Do, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 117, 136 (2010) (noting that 
New York did not have a no-fault law, but instead, had a form of conversion divorce). 
58 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5) (“The husband and wife have lived apart pursuant to 
a decree or judgment of separation for a period of one or more years . . . .”). 
10
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two years to one, exhibiting a loosening of the reins on divorce law.59  
The parties must also live separate and apart pursuant to the terms of 
a separation agreement or judicial decree in what could be considered 
a trial separation.60  Once the parties’ one-year term had been com-
plied with, the party seeking the divorce had to show that he or she 
had substantially abided by the terms of the written agreement or ju-
dicial decree.  At that point, the couple could request that the court 
utilize their trial separation as a conversion ground to obtain a per-
manent judgment of divorce.61 
However, the conversion divorce is a bit of a misnomer, as it 
does not literally manufacture a judgment of divorce out of the par-
ties’ separation agreement, even if the parties have abided by its 
terms.62  On the contrary, an altogether new judgment of divorce 
would be entered if the conversion ground for a divorce was granted, 
although a judge could choose to incorporate the separation agree-
ment in whole, or part, into the judgment of divorce.63  Moreover, be-
fore the parties’ divorce is even granted, equitable distribution, 
maintenance, child support, and other unresolved marital issues must 
be dealt with de novo in the spouses’ action for divorce.64  The no-
fault aspect of a conversion divorce is completely absent when the 
parties seek a divorce based on a judgment of separation as opposed 
to a separation agreement because the judgment of separation does in 
fact require some finding of fault.65  Although the conversion divorce 
falls short of being a true no-fault provision, it was an early attempt 
by the legislature to acknowledge that there was no state or public 
policy interest in forcing a couple to remain in a lifeless marriage.66 
 




62 See id. (explaining an action for divorce “pursuant to a decree or judgment of separa-
tion”). 
63 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(5) (defining conversion divorce). 
64 See, e.g., Blauner v. Blauner, 400 N.Y.S.2d 335, 336 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1977) (hold-
ing that the trial court had the privilege to consider spousal maintenance and child support de 
novo in view of the party’s conversion ground). 
65 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 200 (McKinney 2003) (requiring that the spouse seeking a sepa-
ration judgment allege one of the following grounds: cruel and inhuman treatment, aban-
donment, the neglect and/or refusal to provide support to the other spouse, adultery, and im-
prisonment for three or more years). 
66 See Gleason v. Gleason, 256 N.E.2d 513, 514-15 (N.Y. 1970) (“[T]he Legislature re-
pealed this State’s ancient divorce laws . . . .  [S]ection 170 of the Domestic Relations Law 
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III. THE ENACTMENT OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE IN NEW YORK 
STATE 
In recent years, it became apparent that New York would 
eventually have to join the no-fault party or forever lose its invite.  
The State has come a long way since the days of adultery being the 
lone ground for divorce, and Woody Allen’s witty commentary, “The 
Ten Commandments say ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery,’ but New 
York State says you have to,” no longer applies.67  Now, couples are 
free to file for divorce if the marital relationship has reached its 
breaking point without slinging false allegations of marital infidelities 
at one another.68 
Prior to the no-fault reform, however, many members of the 
legal community complained that the fault-based system was placing 
married couples in a position where they felt compelled to lie to the 
court, or at the very least embellish the less savory details of their 
spouse’s alleged marital flaws to obtain the proper grounds for di-
vorce.69  Malcolm S. Taub, a matrimonial attorney based in Manhat-
tan, has even gone so far as to remark, “What the fault divorce sys-
tem has done is that it has institutionalized perjury . . . . This play-
 
specifie[s] two ‘nonfault’ grounds predicated on a couple’s living apart for a period of two 
years after the granting of a separation judgment or decree or the execution of a written sepa-
ration agreement.”) (citations omitted). 
67 Arlene S. Kayatt, “No-Fault” Divorce in New York One Year Later: Is Breaking up 
Still Hard to Do?, NEW YORK CIVIC (Nov. 4, 2011), http://nycivic.org/story/No-Fault-
divorce-new-york-one-year-later (quoting actor, Woody Allen). 
68 See William Glaberson, Change to Divorce Law Could Recall a TV Quiz Show: “To 
Tell the Truth,” N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/nyregion/ 
17divorce.html?pagewanted=1&fta=y (lamenting, “[f]or decades, New York State’s divorce 
system has been built on a foundation of winks and falsehoods,” based upon the unfortunate 
reality that spouses would feel compelled to lie to the Court to establish grounds for the di-
vorce under the fault-based system). 
69 See, e.g., id. (“If you wanted to split quickly, you and your spouse had to give one of 
the limited number of allowable reasons—including adultery, cruelty, imprisonment or 
abandonment—so there was a tendency to pick one out of a hat.”); Joel Stashenko & Noeleen 
G. Walder, Divorce Lawyers Predict Reduced Costs, Less Stress Under No-Fault, N.Y. L.J. (July 
6, 2010), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202463271835&Divorce_ 
Lawyers_Predict_Reduced_Costs_Less_Stress_Under_NoFault&slreturn=20120924112104 
(“[T]he [fault-based] system forces some spouses, desperate to escape marriages, to commit 
perjury.”) (quoting Lee Rosenberg, Esq. of Saltzman Chetkof & Rosenberg); DiFonzo & 
Stern, supra note 10, at 578 (citing to Howard Hilton Spellman’s observation of the “orgy of 
perjury” that took place in so-called “Mexican divorces,” wherein American couples trav-
elled to Mexican courthouses in an effort to obtain a quick divorce, prior to the 1966 
amendment). 
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acting goes on and everybody looks the other way and follows the 
script.”70  Acting State Supreme Court Justice Jeffrey S. Sunshine, 
the supervising judge of the Second Department, openly critiqued the 
old fault-based system because it frequently required judges to hear 
matters that should remain private between the parties.71  Justice Sun-
shine also remarked on the legal implications of hearing such “he 
said/she said” testimony, stating, “[I]t is not a subject that lends itself 
to an easy decision, since there are often no witnesses to what goes 
on in private.  ‘Some of the claims may be dubious.’ ”72  This disre-
gard for telling the truth on the part of the litigants, the judge’s inabil-
ity to decipher the truth, and the imposition on marital privacy were 
undoubtedly some of the most prevalent factors leading to the refor-
mation of the law in 2010.73  Judges were not the only members of 
the community that were concerned with the state of matrimonial law 
prior to the 2010 enactment.74  Although some women’s groups had 
concerns about what no-fault would mean for the union of marriage, 
and, in particular, the financial ramifications of allowing one spouse 
to unilaterally determine that the marriage was over,75 it was actually 
the Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York that began 
the initial drafting of the current no-fault legislation.76  Sondra Miller, 
one of the legislation’s authors, explained that the original drafters 
 
                                                                                                                                       
70 See Glaberson, supra note 68. 
71 Id. (noting the inherent invasion of privacy into the marital relationship, Judge Sunshine 
asked, “Should we really, . . . in the 21st century be having people get on the stand and testi-
fy that ‘my spouse refused to have sex with me?’ ”). 
72 Id. 
73 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW—No Fault, ch. 384, S. 3890-A (2010) (McKinney) (amend-
ing section 170 of the Domestic Relations Law by adding no-fault divorce); see also S. 3890-
A, 233rd Leg., 2010 Reg. Sess., ch. 384 (N.Y. 2010) (“The above-referenced bills were en-
acted by the Legislature . . . [to] bring about significant and rational reform to New York’s 
process for adjudicating divorce proceedings . . . [and to] help ensure representation for low-
er income individuals . . . and ease the burden on the parties in what is inevitably a difficult 
and costly process.”). 
74 See Glaberson, supra note 68 (explaining how the fault requirement “forced lawyers to 
question clients closely to try to find an acceptable reason to explain the split, even when the 
real reason is pretty simple: The client does not like his or her spouse”). 
75 See Kayatt, supra note 67 (stating that women’s groups “vigorously opposed” no-fault 
divorce); see also Stephanie Coontz, Divorce, No-Fault Style, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/opinion/17coontz.html?pagewanted=all (discussing the 
“trade-offs” that are coupled with social change and the effect such social and legal changes 
may have on the traditional female homemaker who has invested herself in the home as op-
posed to her own potential earning capacity). 
76 Sondra Miller, No Fault Clear and Simple, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 3, 2010. 
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were very cognizant of the need for clear and concise language, not-
ing that there was a purposeful attempt to make the legislation devoid 
of any “unnecessary or ambiguous verbiage.”77  Miller further ex-
plained that the legislative intent behind the No-Fault Divorce Act 
was to both “eliminate the bitterness and hostility engendered by al-
legations of misconduct [and] to eliminate the cost and delay of di-
vorce litigation.”78 
Ultimately, the question becomes whether New York’s in-
tended goal of decreasing costs, time delays, and spousal hostility 
will be realized through the implementation of no-fault divorce.  
Though it seems clear that New York was in desperate need of a 
reformation of its divorce laws to catch up to speed with the rest of 
the country, it appears that the State is fighting an uphill battle.  Di-
vorce can often be an incredibly trying time in a person’s life; there-
fore, it is conceivable that the legislature would aspire to alleviate 
some of the hardships that are inherently coupled with such a pro-
ceeding.  However, because divorce has the unrivaled ability to bring 
out one’s inner most acrimony toward his or her embittered spouse, 
merely removing the grounds requirement will unlikely be enough to 
take the sting out of being served with divorce papers and coming to 
terms with the reality that one’s marriage and/or family will be divid-
ed as a casualty of the dissolution. 
Furthermore, there remains some division among the New 
York trial courts regarding the true legislative intent of the amend-
ment to Domestic Relations Law Section 170.79  Some members of 
the matrimonial law community construe the no-fault provision to 
mean simply what the name implies, an elimination of any need for a 
fault-finding proceeding to determine whether the marital relation-
 
                                                                                                                                       
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Compare Strack v. Strack, 916 N.Y.S.2d 759, 763-64 (Sup. Ct. Essex County 2011) 
(holding that spouses may oppose an assertion of irretrievable breakdown by trial, specifical-
ly finding that “Domestic Relations Law § 170(7) is not a panacea for those hoping to avoid 
a trial”), with A.C. v. D.R., 927 N.Y.S.2d 496, 505 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2011) (“[A] 
plaintiff’s self-serving declaration about his or her state of mind is all that is required for the 
dissolution of a marriage on grounds that it is irretrievably broken.”); see also Stashenko, 
supra note 54 (discussing the state of confusion that the lower courts remain in until further 
appellate decisional law is established to clarify the issue.  Jennifer Goody, Esq. of Wand, 
Powers & Goody has commented that the “courts remain ‘very unclear’ about the level of 
proof, if any, needed to grant a no-fault divorce”). 
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ship has, in fact, “broken down.”80  This group has determined that 
“[i]t is contradictory and violative of the legislative intent that a 
ground based on no wrongdoing, ‘no fault,’ could become the subject 
of fault finding.”81  Sondra Miller, former Justice of the Appellate 
Division, Second Department, is among the camp that believes that a 
plaintiff’s assertion that the marital relationship has irretrievably bro-
ken down for a period of six months or more is sufficient for a di-
vorce to be granted once all of the ancillary financial and custodial 
issues have been resolved.82  Miller posed the question: “Is it possible 
that experienced attorneys discern that the legislative intent was to 
substitute trials on ‘irretrievable breakdown’ for trials on fault?”83 
The opposing school of thought answered that question in the 
affirmative.84  Professor Timothy Tippins, a well-known member of 
the New York matrimonial law community, suggests that defendant-
spouse does have the right to challenge the plaintiff’s assertion that 
the marriage has become irretrievably broken.85  Professor Tippins 
has argued: 
[T]he statute does not express any intent to strip liti-
gants of the opportunity to be heard.  The language to 
which the “no-trial” contingent points in support of the 
proposition that the Legislature was bent on eliminat-
ing the right to trial is the statutory proviso that one 
party has “stated under oath” that the marriage has 
been irretrievably broken for the requisite six months.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
80 See, e.g., Elliott Scheinberg, No-Fault Divorce, Defenses, Pleadings, Independent Ac-
tions, 244 N.Y. L.J. 4, Nov. 30, 2010 (“The Legislature’s requirement of no more than a per-
ceptual statement made under oath eliminates any further exploration as to underlying 
fact.”); Miller, supra note 76 (explaining the legislative purpose as follows: “This legislation 
enables parties to legally end a marriage which is in reality already over and cannot be sal-
vaged.  Its intent is to lessen the disputes that often arise between the parties and to mitigate 
the potential harm to them and their children caused by the current process”). 
81 See Scheinberg, supra note 80. 
82 Miller, supra note 76. 
83 Id. 
84 See, e.g., Timothy M. Tippins, No-Fault Divorce and Due Process, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 3 
2011), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202483982370&NoFault 
_Divorce_And_Due_Process (“The Legislature enacted a no-fault statute, not a no-ground 
statute, and not a no-trial statute.  It did not enact divorce-on-demand.  The new ground 
hinges on the ultimate conclusion that the marriage has been irretrievably broken for at least 
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That is a rather anemic argument upon which to an-
chor the deprivation of due process of law.86 
Professor Tippins has suggested that the courts will be reduced “to a 
mere rubber stamp for fraud and perjury” if defendants are not given 
the opportunity to present evidence to oppose their spouses’ allega-
tions that the marital relationship has become defunct.87 
Although it is difficult not to side with the faction supporting 
a litigant’s right to be heard and challenge his or her spouse’s unilat-
eral assertion of irretrievable breakdown, the law, as written, does not 
support such a conclusion.  Consequently, in view of the language 
contained in the statute, the Nassau County Supreme Court in A.C. v. 
D.R.,88 correctly held that: 
[T]he Legislature did not intend nor is there a defense 
to DRL § 170(7).  Suggestions that the party wishing 
to stay married has a constitutional right that is being 
infringed upon in violation of due process is unavail-
ing.  Staying married, against the wishes of the other 
adult who states under oath that the marriage is irre-
trievably broken, is not a vested right.  “Marital rights 
have always been treated as inchoate or contingent and 
may be taken away by legislation before they vest.”89 
Based upon a reading of the language used in DRL Section 270(7), it 
is abundantly clear that the legislature intended to ease the hardship 
of establishing grounds by allowing one party to determine that the 
marriage is unsalvageable.  DRL Section 270(7) provides, “An action 
for divorce may be maintained [if] . . . [t]he relationship between 
husband and wife has broken down irretrievably for a period of at 
least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath.”90  
Thus, based upon the plain meaning of the statute, one can conclude 
that it is the plaintiff’s subjective prerogative to determine whether 
the marriage has been irreparably harmed for the requisite statutory 
period.  Under the current legislation, although one spouse believes 
the marriage is capable of repair, it does not mean that the other 
 
                                                                                                                                       
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 927 N.Y.S.2d 496 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2011). 
89 Id. at 506 (quoting Gleason, 265 N.E.2d at 519). 
90 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 270(7). 
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spouse is entitled to defend against the assertions of the party moving 
for the dissolution.91  Such an interpretation of the law would, as 
Sondra Miller suggests, result in the counterintuitive substitution of 
trials on the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage for trials concern-
ing one spouse’s fault.92 
The addition of no-fault divorce may alleviate some of the ini-
tial stresses of having to assert often embarrassing or painful grounds 
against the other spouse, but the new legislation is not capable of tru-
ly fostering a cooperative environment devoid of all emotional an-
guish.  Over the course of the relationship, couples acquire real prop-
erty, financial assets, educational degrees, retirement benefits, and 
many produce children.  When it comes to divorce, couples are fac-
ing the prospect of divvying up two things that are nearest and dear-
est to their hearts: their children and their finances.  It is this emotion 
that has the potential to give rise to protracted litigation concerning 
the equitable division of the marital property, as well as the custody 
and/or visitation issues relating to the parties’ children.93  Therefore, 
the legislative purpose behind the enactment of no-fault may be a bit 
optimistic,94 in view of the fact that fighting over grounds is not gen-
erally what prolongs divorce proceedings and increases the cost of lit-
igation.95  Rather, it is the suspicion and disbelief over the respective 
spouses’ finances, the hiring of forensic accountants, and other ex-
perts to uncover the “truth” that greatly increases the cost for di-
vorce.96 
Although the no-fault system may not be entirely effective in 
 
                                                                                                                                       
91 Miller, supra note 76. 
92 Id. 
93 See Horowitz, supra note 7 (“False accusations and the necessity to hold one partner at 
fault often result in conflict within the family.  The conflict is harmful to the partners and 
destructive to the emotional well being of children.  Prolonging the divorce process adds ad-
ditional stress to an already difficult situation.”). 
94 See Miller, supra note 76 (“We were careful to avoid unnecessary or ambiguous verbi-
age: the purpose of the long-awaited reform was not only to eliminate the bitterness and hos-
tility engendered by allegations of misconduct, but to eliminate the cost and delay of divorce 
litigation.”). 
95 See, e.g., Stashenko, supra note 8 (Attorney Susan Bender from the firm Bender Rosen-
thal Isaacs & Richter, posits that the enactment of no-fault will bear little impact on divorce 
litigation, explaining that, “[i]n our practice, the grounds for divorce are rarely the issue, it is 
custody and financial issues. . . .  The divorce cannot be finalized until everything else is 
done, [and] [b]y that time, the clients are so litigation-weary that you say, ‘Adultery?’  They 
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carrying out the proposed legislative intent, it is not the position of 
this Comment that divorce litigants were in a better position under 
the old fault-based system.  On the contrary, some have suggested 
that fault should be accounted for in determining certain elements of 
a couple’s divorce proceeding.97  This position is understandable 
from a litigant’s perspective because it may allow a litigant the 
chance to air his or her spouse’s grievances to the court in hopes of a 
larger financial award upon dissolution.98  Additionally, from an 
emotional standpoint, it might give some disgruntled spouses comfort 
in just having someone to listen to their side of the story, whether it is 
the presiding judge or even their attorney.99  Because divorce is so 
emotionally charged, litigants may believe that they are being disad-
vantaged by the denial of more illustrative grounds for divorce.  
However, parties must bear in mind that no-fault divorce is not 
equivalent to “no-ground” divorce, and the plaintiff in an action for 
divorce is still responsible for establishing that the marital relation-





                                                                                                                                       
97 See Guidice, supra note 19, at 791.  Guidice argues that: 
[F]ault should matter in the division of assets, even where it is properly 
excluded from the reasons for divorce.  By allowing fault to be taken in-
to account when determining maintenance awards, New York courts 
would maintain the requisite authority to provide equitable post-divorce 
settlements regardless of which party desired the divorce. 
Id. 
98 See Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113-14 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1984) 
(holding that although equitable distribution awards are not typically based upon marital 
misconduct, a trier of fact may consider this as a factor in its final disposition in “situations 
in which the marital misconduct is so egregious or uncivilized as to bespeak of a blatant dis-
regard of the marital relationship—misconduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ of the court 
thereby compelling it to invoke its equitable power to do justice between the parties”). 
99 See Glaberson, supra note 68 (noting the dual role of attorneys under the fault system, 
“I have to sit there like a shrink or I’m not even sure what, but definitely not a lawyer . . . .”). 
100 Tippins, supra note 84. 
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IV. THE ULTIMATE DOMESTIC RELATIONS REFORM: NEW 
YORK’S MARRIAGE EQUALITY ACT 
A. Domestic Relations Issues for Non-traditional 
Spouses and Families Prior to the Enactment of the 
Marriage Equality Act 
The enactment of no-fault divorce legislation was the start of 
the modern wave of divorce reform that New York has experienced 
in recent years.101  However, it was not until the passage and subse-
quent effectuation of the Marriage Equality Act on July 24, 2011, that 
New York’s domestic relations laws came to be viewed as progres-
sive and, without question, controversial.102 
Although marriage prior to July 24, 2011, was limited to only 
those relationships between a man and a woman, New York State has 
some relatively recent history with the issue of same-sex marriage, 
even prior to the passage of the new law.103  Specifically, in 2008, on-
ly three years before passing its own Marriage Equality Act, the Su-
preme Court of New York County presided over Beth R. v. Donna 
M.,104 a divorce proceeding concerning a lesbian couple whose mar-
riage was performed in Canada.105  Several weeks earlier, the Fourth 
 
                                                                                                                                       
101 Note that although divorce reform commenced in 1966, with the addition of several 
more grounds for divorce, this was only the predecessor to what would become the modern 
era of reformation for New York domestic relation laws.  See Stashenko, supra note 8 (ac-
knowledging that New York State was the last of the union to enact no-fault divorce, stating 
that “it is the first substantial change to the grounds-based divorce law since 1966 . . . [since 
then], [t]wo other new divorce-related laws also went into effect . . . .”). 
102 See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, New York Town Clerk Refuses to Let Same-Sex Couple Get 
Married, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 15, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/15/new- 
york-town-refuses-to-marry-gay-couple_n_964595.html (reporting that a town clerk from 
Ledyard, New York, has refused to issue marriage certificates to same-sex couples seeking 
to marry.  The clerk was met with opposition by the president of People for the American 
Way Foundation, who asserted, “Public officials can’t pick and choose the laws they want to 
follow . . . .  If a public official simply decides to shirk the obligations of her office, then she 
should resign and be replaced by someone who will do the job and carry out state law”). 
103 See, e.g., Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501, 502 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2008) 
(dealing with a divorce action stemming from a same-sex marriage consummated in Cana-
da); Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2008) 
(concluding that the marriage of a Canadian same-sex couple was legally recognized in New 
York). 
104 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2008). 
105 Id. at 502. 
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Department recognized a same-sex marriage performed outside of 
New York State for the first time.106  This was one of the first times 
in New York’s history that the State expanded the boundaries of its 
domestic relations laws to encompass a same-sex divorce issue.107 
Beth R. is particularly interesting because it also concerned 
two minor children arising from separate artificial fertilization proce-
dures.108  The first child was born prior to the parties’ marriage in 
2004, and the second was born approximately two years after the 
women’s nuptials.109  The plaintiff paid for the insemination proce-
dures but she was never permitted by the defendant to officially adopt 
the children through a non-biological second parent adoption pro-
cess.110  The children did however utilize the last name of the non-
biological mother.111  Both parties were responsible for caring for and 
providing emotional and financial support for the health and wellbe-
ing of their two children.112  In all respects, each party held herself 
out to be the children’s parent.113 
In 2006, a few years into the marriage, the defendant-wife ex-
pressed her desire to terminate the marriage and subsequently “served 
a Notice to Quit on [the] [p]laintiff to remove her from the [defend-
ant’s Manhattan] apartment.”114  The plaintiff responded by filing for 
divorce in April 2007, and “the parties entered into a stipulation” of 
visitation concerning the two children.115  Thereafter, the defendant 
moved to have the divorce action dismissed on the ground that the 
marriage was void pursuant to New York law and, therefore, no di-
vorce could be granted.116 
The court, however, found that in light of the absence of any 
 
                                                                                                                                       
106 Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 743. 
107 Beth R. at 506; see also Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 743 (recognizing same-sex mar-
riages solemnized outside of the United States to be valid under the laws of New York State, 
and further finding the denial of one partner’s employment benefits to the other spouse to be 
a form of discrimination unlawfully based upon the employee’s sexual orientation). 
108 Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 503; see also In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398, 405-06 (1995) (recognizing the 
right of same-sex second parent adoptions in the State of New York). 
111 Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 503. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 503-04. 
114 Id. at 503. 
115 Id. at 504. 
116 Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 504. 
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prevailing statutory authority, the issue of same-sex divorce was sub-
ject to the common law and doctrine of reciprocity between jurisdic-
tions.117  The court specifically looked to the fact that “New York 
courts have long held that out-of-state marriages, if valid where en-
tered will be respected in New York even if under New York law the 
marriage would be void.”118  Nonetheless, the courts have recognized 
two circumstances which allow deviation from the rule of comity, 
stating, “New York will not recognize either a marriage prohibited by 
positive law of this state or a marriage abhorrent to New York public 
policy.”119  In reality, the courts have only applied this exception in 
cases involving incestuous marital relationships and polygamy.120  
Therefore, this deviation from the rule is construed very narrowly. 
Furthermore, the residency requirements of DRL Section 230 
were satisfied in this case, thus giving the court the ability to ulti-
mately grant the parties a judgment of divorce.121  Subsection two of 
the Required Residence of Parties statute of DRL Section 230 states: 
An action to annul a marriage, or to declare the nullity 
of a void marriage, or for divorce or separation may be 
maintained only when . . . [t]he parties have resided in 
this state as husband and wife and either party is a res-
ident thereof when the action is commenced and has 
been a resident for a continuous period of one year 
immediately preceding.122 
Although Beth R. and Donna M. married in Canada, they resided in a 
New York apartment together for the duration of the marriage.123  
This Manhattan residence, therefore, satisfied New York’s residency 
requirement under DRL Section 230(2).124 
However, litigants to a divorce proceeding in New York State 
 





121 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 230 (stipulating when an action for divorce may be grant-
ed). 
122 Id. at § 230(2). 
123 Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03. 
124 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 230(2) (requiring that the parties live together as husband 
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are also subject to the statutory and constitutional mandates that give 
courts the authority to render decisions concerning the equitable dis-
tribution of the parties’ marital property, as well as custody and visit-
ation of any children of the marriage.125  In rem and personal jurisdic-
tion must first be established before any court can issue a binding 
decision over the parties.126  In rem jurisdiction is created under Civil 
Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) 314,127 and personal jurisdiction is 
established under CPLR 302(4)(b).128  CPLR 302(4)(b) is especially 
important in divorce proceedings because of its ability to grant the 
court personal jurisdiction over a defendant-spouse, even if that 
spouse no longer lives within the boundaries of the state.129  The lan-
guage of this statute provides in part that the party seeking monetary 
support, “distributive awards or special relief in [divorce] actions 
may exercise personal jurisdiction over” a non-resident defendant so 
long as the party moving for the support is a resident or domicile of 
the state in which the marital domicile existed prior to couple’s sepa-
ration.130  Beth R. and Donna M. met the statutory and constitutional 
requirements for residency and jurisdiction because both spouses re-
mained within New York State throughout the duration of their mar-
riage.131  However, other same-sex couples seeking divorces in New 
York State must also take notice of these requirements if they wish to 
have the New York court system preside over their divorce. 
Once the jurisdictional elements were deemed satisfied, the 
court in Beth R. ultimately held that the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss the divorce action must be denied132 in view of the Fourth De-
partment’s contemporary decision in Martinez v. County of Mon-
roe.133  Martinez based its finding upon an alternative reading of the 
 
                                                                                                                                       
125 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 314 (McKinney 2012) (setting forth the service requirements that 
grant New York courts in rem jurisdiction over a litigant’s property that is located within the 
state.  This allows service to be completed on a defendant living outside of the State of New 
York, so long as he or she has property that is present in the state); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(4)(b) 
(granting personal jurisdiction of the courts over a non-resident spouse for purposes of 
spousal or child support, so long as the party seeking such support is domiciled in the state). 
126 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 301; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 314; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(4)(b). 
127 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 314. 
128 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(4)(b). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 502-03. 
132 Id. at 509. 
133 850 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (App. Div. 2008) (“The Legislature may decide to prohibit the 
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2006 Court of Appeals decision in Hernandez v. Robles,134 which 
held same-sex marriages were neither permitted by New York’s do-
mestic relation laws nor the State Constitution.135  The Fourth De-
partment in Martinez interpreted Hernandez to mean that although 
actual solemnization of same-sex marriages was not permitted under 
state law, the recognition of same-sex marriages from other permit-
ting jurisdictions was not barred by the New York State Constitution 
or by public policy.136  The plaintiff in Beth R. thus argued that “she 
[was] entitled to maintain an on-going [parental] relationship with . . . 
the [two] children” born to the couple.137  This was met with opposi-
tion by the defendant, who averred that the plaintiff had not legally 
adopted the children, and, therefore, had no such lawful right to exer-
cise visitation with the minors.138 
In addressing the defendant’s argument, the court cited to 
Shondel J. v. Mark D.,139 a New York Court of Appeals case, wherein 
that court determined that: 
The potential damage to a child’s psyche caused by 
suddenly ending established parental support need on-
ly be stated to be appreciated.  Cutting off that sup-
port, whether emotional or financial, may leave the 
child in a worse position than if the support had never 
been given. . . . [T]he issue does not involve the equi-
ties between the two adults; the case turns exclusively 
on the best interests of the child.140 
The decision in Shondel J. is crucial to the issue of non-
biological parental rights and obligations.  The New York Court of 
Appeals was clear in its message “that both the statute and case law 
required that the best interests of the child controlled whether a per-
 
recognition of same-sex marriages solemnized abroad.  Until it does so, however, such mar-
riages are entitled to recognition in New York.”). 
134 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (2006) (holding that the question of same-sex marriage should be left 
to the legislature to decide, and “that the New York State Constitution does not compel 
[such] recognition” until the legislature speaks to the issue). 
135 Id. at 8-9. 
136 Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 743. 
137 Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 506. 
138 Id. 
139 853 N.E.2d 610 (2006). 




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
412 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
 
son was required to continue support payments, even if it was belat-
edly determined that he was not the biological parent.”141 
In applying the de facto parent or equitable estoppel142 princi-
ples, the court determined that the parties had “held out plaintiff to 
the world” and, most compellingly, presented the plaintiff as the par-
ent to the children.143  Although the plaintiff in Beth R. was a non-
adoptive and non-biological parental figure, the court nonetheless 
concluded that it was in the best interest of the children to permit the 
plaintiff to be heard through her motion for custody.144  Specifically, 
the court in Beth R. offered the sound reasoning that “[i]f the concern 
of both the legislature and the Court of Appeals is what is in the 
child’s best interest, a formulaic approach to finding that a ‘parent’ 
can only mean a biologic or adoptive parent may not always be ap-
propriate.”145 
In reaching its conclusion, the court admonished the defend-
ant for her efforts “to minimize the significance of the act of mar-
riage” in order to similarly reduce the plaintiff’s role as a parental 
figure in the children’s lives.146  The court specifically defined the 
importance of the institution for the defendant: “Marriage is ‘a status 
founded on contract and established by law.  It constitutes an institu-
tion involving the highest interests of society.  It is regulated and con-
trolled by law based upon principles of public policy affecting the 
welfare of the people of the State.’ ”147  Here, it is evident that the 
court sought to underscore the importance of the family unit, irre-
 
                                                                                                                                       
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 508, which states: 
[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel is imposed by law in the interest of 
fairness to prevent the enforcement of rights which would work [a] fraud 
or injustice upon the person against whom enforcement is sought and 
who, in justifiable reliance upon the opposing party’s words or conduct, 
has been misled into acting upon the belief that such enforcement would 
not be sought[] . . . . The paramount concern in applying equitable es-
toppel in these cases has been and continues to be, the best interests of 
the child. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Jean Maby H. v. Joseph H., 676 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 1998)). 
143 Id. 
144 Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 508-09. 
145 Id. at 508. 
146 Id. at 509. 
147 Id.  (quoting Fearon v. Treanor, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936)). 
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spective of the sex or biological status of each party in relation to 
their children.148  Finally, although the court deferred its ultimate de-
cision regarding the status of plaintiff’s continuing relationship and 
obligations to her children until a later custody conference, the court 
did indicate that the plaintiff may be considered the legitimate parent 
of the child who was conceived after the parties’ date of marriage.149  
Unfortunately, this specific circumstance leaves the child born prior 
to the date of marriage at a disadvantage and somewhat in a stage of 
legal limbo as a result of the failure to pursue a second-parent adop-
tion of the child.150  It is situations like the ones faced by the parties 
in Beth R. that demonstrate that same-sex couples desiring to build 
families clearly face obstacles when the federal government and the 
vast majority of states refuse to legally recognize their relationships 
as legitimate.151  Unlike traditional heterosexual couples, who have 
the benefit of the presumption that all children born throughout the 
duration of the marriage are legitimate children of the marriage,152 
same-sex, non-biological parents must seek second-parent adoption 
to best protect their parenting rights, especially in the event of di-
 
                                                                                                                                       
148 See id. (“Although Defendant seeks to minimize the significance of the act of mar-
riage, the law does not share her view. . . .  As a result of being married, Plaintiff may be 
constrained to provide support for the Defendant and Defendant would be a recipient of a 
portion of Plaintiff’s estate.  These factors significantly affect the children’s welfare.  More-
over, although people enter into marriages for many reasons, creating familial bonds is one 
of the most significant reasons, particularly for the benefit of their children.”). 
149 Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 509; see N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (McKinney 2008).  Sec-
tion 73 was enacted on July 21, 2008 to deal with the issue of children born via artificial in-
semination, as was the case in Beth R.  Id.  The statute states: “Any child born to a married 
woman by means of artificial insemination performed by persons duly authorized to practice 
medicine and with the consent in writing of the woman and her husband, shall be deemed the 
legitimate, birth child of the husband and his wife for all purposes.”  Id. 
150 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73 (failing to discuss the rights of children born by way of 
artificial insemination prior to marriage). 
151 See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (defining marriage as “a legal union between one man and one wom-
an”); Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra 
note 28 (enumerating that only ten jurisdictions permit for same-sex marriage). 
152 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24(1) (McKinney 2012), stating in full: 
A child heretofore or hereafter born of parents who prior or subsequent 
to the birth of such child shall have entered into a civil or religious mar-
riage, or shall have consummated a common-law marriage where such 
marriage is recognized as valid, in the manner authorized by the law of 
the place where such marriage takes place, is the legitimate child of both 
birth parents notwithstanding that such marriage is void or voidable or 
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vorce.153  Second-parent adoptions allow the non-biological parent to 
fully adopt his or her child and enjoy equal co-parenting rights with 
his or her significant other or spouse.154 
In view of the fact that same-sex partners do not have the tra-
ditional means of biological procreation available to them, the reality 
that one parent may be left out of the biological makeup of his or her 
child is something that will have to be taken into consideration under 
the new laws.155  Although unfortunate for many, the truth is: 
Despite the coparents’ intent to conceive and raise a 
child together, and despite long-standing, nurturing, 
supporting, and loving parental roles, a same-sex 
coparent is often a third party in the eyes of the law.  
Because of a lack of biological connection, a coparent 
becomes a nonparent and, thus, a stranger.156 
Thus, a same-sex parent’s most viable and protective option is to pro-
ceed with a second parent adoption at the earliest possible stage fol-
lowing the child’s birth to best ensure one’s parental access to the 
child. 
B. Domestic Relations and the Effect on Family Law 
Under the Marriage Equality Act 
Notwithstanding the momentous passage of the Marriage 
Equality Act and similar laws pertaining to same-sex marriage in oth-
er states, some in the legal community are still concerned that same-
sex couples will face considerably greater hardships than their heter-
osexual counterparts if the marriage fails.157  Specifically, same-sex 
 
                                                                                                                                       
153 Marissa Wiley, Note, Redefining the Legal Family: Protecting the Rights of Coparents 
and the Best Interests of their Children, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 319, 321-22 (2009) (“New 
York State must recognize and protect nontraditional families through each possible mecha-
nism, including second-parent adoption, coparenting agreements, judicial resolutions, and 
legislative action in order to foster and preserve loving parenting relationships and to truly 
serve the best interests of a child.”). 
154 Id. at 323 (“This form of adoption is currently the best way for a coparent to fortify the 
legal parental relationship because it places the coparent in legal parity with the biological 
parent.”). 
155 Id. at 321-22. 
156 Id. at 319-20. 
157 See, e.g., Elisabeth Oppenheimer, No Exit: The Problem of Same-Sex Divorce, 90 N.C. 
L. REV. 73, 74 (2011) (“Same-sex divorce is one of the most complicated and least discussed 
26
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spouses may face greater strains on their familial bonds should they 
decide to terminate their marital partnership and instead become liti-
gants in a divorce proceeding.158  As previously touched upon, the 
possibility of at least one of the parties to a same-sex marriage being 
a non-biological or non-adoptive parent is a prevalent reality in the 
modern familial landscape.159 
This may not be a problem for same-sex spouses while they 
are a united family, but in the event of divorce, people change and so, 
too, do their intentions.160  What may begin as two people starting 
their marital life together and building a family may result in a bitter 
clash over custody, with one parent using his or her biological paren-
tal status to trump the non-biological spouse in court.161  This seems 
inherently unfair to both the parents and, more importantly, to the 
children who may have their relationship with a parental figure sev-
ered with little to no say in the matter.  The court in Beth R. lamented 
“A child by the age of three clearly identifies with parental figures.  
The abrupt exclusion of a parental figure may be damaging to the 
emotional well being of that child.”162  This is a valid public policy 
issue that must be considered when dealing with the burgeoning area 
of same-sex domestic relations law. 
There has been some ambiguity as to whether same-sex 
spouses will receive the same presumption of legitimacy for children 
 
aspects of the gay rights movement. . . .  One of the first things family lawyers tell excited 
gay couples planning to marry may come as a surprise: maybe they should reconsider.”); 
Harriet Newman Cohen, Bonnie E. Rabin & Tim James, Marriage Equality Remains an As-
piration: Non-recognition Statutes Pose Legal Complications for Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. 
L.J. (Aug. 1, 2011) (noting the uphill battle that same-sex couples still face as a result of fed-
eral non-recognition of same-sex marriage, and remarking that this issue “greatly 
complicat[es] the legal landscape for same-sex married couples”). 
158 See Oppenheimer, supra note 157, at 73 (“There are people desperate to end their mar-
riages who are unable to do so, and there are same-sex couples unwilling to get married in 
the first place because divorce may be unavailable.”). 
159 See Wiley, supra note 153, at 359 (opining that “New York State must be tolerant and 
flexible with the innumerable variations of family compositions and protect all families 
equally in order to faithfully enforce the state policy of placing a child’s welfare before all 
other concerns in the dissolution of a family”). 
160 See, e.g., Beth R., 853 N.Y.S.2d at 503-04, 506 (demonstrating how the parties’ inten-
tions changed once the divorce proceeding began, with the defendant-mother seeking to bar 
plaintiff’s access to her non-biological children conceived during the parties’ three year mar-
riage). 
161 See id. at 502-06. 
162 Id. at 509. 
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born to their marriages as enumerated in section 24 of the DRL.163  It 
is this author’s opinion that same-sex parents will enjoy the benefits 
of that provision along with heterosexual couples based upon a plain 
meaning interpretation of the statute.164  Furthermore, although the 
recent changes to the law may ultimately render second-parent adop-
tions obsolete, diligent attorneys are continuing to urge their clients 
to pursue such proceedings in order to best protect their parenting 
rights under the law.165 
Attorneys are primarily recommending this precautionary 
procedure to protect their clients from the perils of travelling or, bet-
ter yet, from parties who move to another state or jurisdiction that 
does not participate in reciprocity with New York State’s domestic 
relations laws.166  In such states, same-sex parents may unwillingly 
have their parental rights stripped from them absent any formal doc-
umentation showing their parental status under the law.167  This un-
 
                                                                                                                                       
163 See, e.g., Lee Rosenberg, Marriage and Divorce: An Overview of Rights, Obligations 
and Options for Non-Traditional Couples, NASSAU LAWYER, at 20, (Nov. 2011) (explaining 
that “there is technically no court decision extending the presumption of legitimacy to chil-
dren of same sex married couples, but the gender neutral language of the Marriage Equality 
Act . . . would lead one to believe that it would be extended”); Chris Hawley & Michael Hill, 
Gay Marriage Will Spur Adoption Boom, New York Lawyers Predict, HUFFINGTON POST, 
July 11, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/11/gay-marriage-adoption_n_894916.html 
(remarking on the likelihood that the Marriage Equality Act “will make second-parent adop-
tion unnecessary” going forward). 
164 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24(1) states: 
A child heretofore or hereafter born of parents who prior or subsequent 
to the birth of such child shall have entered into a civil or religious mar-
riage, or shall have consummated a common-law marriage where such 
marriage is recognized as valid, in the manner authorized by the law of 
the place where such marriage takes place, is the legitimate child of both 
birth parents notwithstanding that such marriage is void or voidable or 
has been or shall hereafter be annulled or judicially declared void. 
Id. 
165 See Abby Tolchinsky & Ellie Wertheim, Creative Parenting Agreements Still Needed 
with Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 29, 2011) (Teresa Calabrese, collaborative lawyer 
and mediator stated, “Until our marriages have full recognition in the United States, I will 
always urge my clients to file second-parent adoptions.  I think that is the only way to ensure 
that this legal relationship will be fully recognized and the only way to protect your fami-
ly . . . .”). 
166 Id. 
167 See Rosenberg, supra note 163, warning: 
Even if New York does recognize the child as being born of the mar-
riage, recognition of the non-biological parent’s rights will still be at is-
sue in other jurisdictions which do not recognize same sex marriage 
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nerving possibility has caused one attorney to comment that “[g]iven 
the foregoing complexities, ambiguities and uncertainties, non-
traditional families need greater protection than most ‘straight’ cou-
ples, particularly while DOMA and non-portability laws remain in ef-
fect in other states.”168 
C. The Full Faith and Credit Problem 
A new host of problems arises as same-sex couples who are 
now legally permitted to marry in New York State are forced to navi-
gate the unfriendly waters of states that have mini-DOMAs on the 
books.169  Traditionally, the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article 
IV, Section 1 of the United States Constitution170 requires that: 
Such acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies 
thereof, so authenticated, shall have the same full faith 
and credit in every court within the United States and 
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or 
usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Posses-
sion from which they are taken.171 
However, the enactment of DOMA has carved an exception 
into the longstanding principles mandated in the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.172  DOMA effectively circumvents the Full Faith and Credit 
and procedure of comity between states by permitting that: 
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, 
or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any 
public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other 
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a rela-
tionship between persons of the same sex that is treat-
ed as a marriage under the laws of such other State, 
 
when the parents, individually or together, travel or change residency to 
a jurisdiction that does not recognize their marriage. 
Id. 
168 Id. 
169 See Cohen et al., supra note 157 (“The courts of many states, primarily those that have 
adopted state DOMAs, are likely to refuse to adjudicate divorces between samesex couples, 
denying them access to the courts to obtain a definitive and, one hopes, fair determination of 
their respective rights and duties going forward.”). 
170 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006). 
171 Id. 
172 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
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territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim aris-
ing from such relationship.173 
Accordingly, DOMA serves to bar the federal government 
from recognizing same-sex marriages and further gives the states, ter-
ritories, and possessions the permission to “opt-out” of upholding any 
court orders, legislative enactments, or records that recognize and 
permit same-sex marital unions.174  This enactment has resulted in 
widespread marriage inequality across the United States, whereby 
same-sex spouses are prevented from enjoying the same federal bene-
fits as their heterosexual equivalents.175  The problem of DOMA, and 
the mini-DOMAS enacted by states throughout the country, is that 
“[i]n our highly mobile society . . . they create enormous uncertainty 
for same-sex couples, who cannot know to what states or countries 
their careers, lifestyle preferences and/or family obligations may 
cause them to move, or where they will find themselves when fate 
lands one spouse in the hospital.”176  Even more, same-sex spouses 
who file for divorce in states operating under local DOMA laws may 
be turned away from a courthouse that refuses to adjudicate a divorce 
for spouses of the same gender.177 
D. Legal Limbo: Why Same-Sex Divorce and 
Equitable Distribution May be the Biggest 
Obstacle to Overcome Yet 
DOMA’s influence is far reaching across the United States 
and even impacts same-sex couples who are married and residing in 
states, such as New York, that recognize the institution of same-sex 
marriage.178  Although the goal of New York’s recent Act was mar-
 
                                                                                                                                       
173 Id. 
174 See Cohen et al., supra note 157 (noting the dual effect that DOMA has on non-
recognition of same-sex marriages at both the federal level and state level, by circumvention 




178 See John M. Yarwood, Note, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: Mini-DOMA States, Migra-
tory Same-Sex Marriage, Divorce, and a Practical Solution to Property Division, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 1355, 1359 (2009) (explaining that under DOMA, states are given the choice to ignore 
same-sex marriage legally performed in another state, “[t]hus, same-sex couples married in a 
state which permits same-sex marriage cannot rely on the many federal benefits and rights 
granted to married couples in the state in which the marriage was executed (the home state) 
30
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riage equality, which in turn encompasses divorce equality, inequities 
continue to be a reality for same-sex couples seeking to dissolve the 
marital bond.179  One New York attorney who specializes in same-sex 
family law has predicted that, “even those couples facing no extraor-
dinary obstacles to divorce would find it a very different experience 
from that of heterosexual couples.”180  One of the central issues to 
any divorce is the equitable distribution of the marital property.181  
This is so because equitable distribution entails the division of prop-
erty and title claims for both real and personal property, acquired by 
the spouses throughout the course of their marriage, and distributed 
through court order.182 
Unfortunately, for many same-sex couples, the equitable dis-
tribution of their joint marital assets may be a more difficult task 
when compared to the experiences of traditional heterosexual divorc-
es.183  Same-sex spouses, who once celebrated the recognition and 
solemnization of their marriages in recent years, are now “discover-
 
or abroad”). 
179 See Cohen et al., supra note 157. 
New York State has now made same-sex marriage legal, but the title of 
the new law, the Marriage Equality Act, remains aspirational.  Non 
recognition statutes and other factors create issues that family law practi-
tioners must be aware of in counseling same-sex couples planning for 
their future . . . or those seeking to end their marriages. 
Id. 
180 John Schwartz, When Same-Sex Marriages End, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/sunday-review/03divorce.html?pagewanted=all (quot-
ing Margaret M. Brady, Esq.). 
181 See Brett R. Turner, The Equitable Distribution Concept, 1 Equit. Distrib. of Property, 
3d § 1.1, 1 (last updated Nov. 2011) (“Because both parties contribute to that partnership, 
they are both legally entitled to a fair share of the partnership profits—the property accumu-
lated during the marriage.”). 
182 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 234 (McKinney 2012), instructing that in divorce proceed-
ings: 
[T]he court may (1) determine any question as to the title to property 
arising between the parties, and (2) make such direction, between the 
parties, concerning the possession of property, as in the court’s discre-
tion justice requires having regard to the circumstances of the case and 
of the respective parties. 
Id.; see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236 (setting forth the relevant factors that a court must 
consider in making determination as to the parties equitable distribution). 
183 See Sue Horton, The Next Same-Sex Challenge: Divorce, LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 25 
2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/25/local/me-gaydivorce25 (“[E]ven in states where 
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ing that getting divorced can be far more complicated than getting 
married.”184  Irrespective of the fact that same-sex spouses have the 
same right as heterosexual spouses to obtain a divorce, “a clash be-
tween federal and state laws makes the process anything but 
equal.”185 
Among the inequities that same-sex couples face when di-
vorcing is the probability that one of the spouses may be forced to 
pay additional taxes associated with the division and transfer of mari-
tal property as a result of a settlement agreement or judgment of di-
vorce.186  For instance, in New York State pensions are construed to 
be marital property subject to equitable distribution.187  Although 
same-sex spouses will be equally entitled to a division of their signif-
icant others’ pension plans, they may also be subject to early with-
drawal penalties and taxes under the federal law because their mar-
riage is not recognized at the federal level.188  Conversely, traditional 
divorces avoid “triggering” such tax ramifications because the federal 
law has carved an exception for those marriages between a man and a 
woman.189 
The pension problem is not the only obstacle same-sex di-
vorcees will face.  Because the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) cur-
rently treats transfers of marital property and assets as a “non-taxable 
event,” traditional spouses are not subject to federal tax implications 
associated with such transfers during the time of marriage or upon 
divorce.190  However, because DOMA prevents federal recognition of 
 
                                                                                                                                       
184 See id. (noting that the biggest difficulties for same-sex spouses are still to come with 
the problems they may face in obtaining a same-sex divorce). 
185 Id. 
186 See id. (enumerating the discrepancies in the law of equitable distribution facing same-
sex couples, and the various tax consequences that face them upon divorce). 
187 See Majauskas v. Majauskas, 463 N.E.2d 15, 19 (N.Y. 1984) (recognizing pensions as 
property of the marriage and determining a “formula” by which pensions are to be divided 
amongst divorcing spouses). 
188 See Horton, supra note 183 (“If a judge orders a heterosexual couple to divide a pen-
sion during a divorce, federal law allows the pension to be divided without triggering early 
withdrawal penalties.  Divorcing gay couples must pay the penalties.”). 
189 Id. 
190 26 U.S.C. § 1041(a) (2006) (“No gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of prop-
erty from an individual to (or in trust for the benefit of)—(1) A spouse, or (2) a former 
spouse, but only if the transfer is incident to a divorce.”). See also Eric I. Wrubel, The Gay 
Divorce: New York Will Have Many.  Now What?, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 19, 2011) (discussing the 
various financial problems and tax implications facing same-sex couples during a divorce 
proceeding). 
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same-sex marriages, couples seeking same-sex divorces may be sub-
jected to certain tax consequences, whereas their heterosexual coun-
terparts would be protected under the umbrella of a federally recog-
nized marital union.191  In effect, the IRS views these same-sex 
spouses as strangers who happen to be completing a property or asset 
transfer and, thus, may subject them to the standard taxation without 
any consideration of the parties’ marital status at the state level.192  A 
basic function of equitable distribution, such as “the transfer of the 
marital residence between same-sex spouses incident to their divorce 
could be considered a ‘third-party’ sale, which would trigger capital 
gains taxes owed by the transferor (i.e., the seller).”193  Likewise, set-
tlement agreements may be stifled by the effect that lump sum cash 
payments may have with respect to tax implications.194  A cash pay-
ment or transfer of property tendered by one same-sex spouse to the 
other as a result of a divorce settlement or requirement of court-
ordered equitable distribution will likely be subject to a gift tax im-
posed by the IRS.195 
Spousal support, also known as maintenance or alimony, will 
be at issue for same-sex couples seeking to receive the same equity 
that traditional couples receive as a result of divorce.196  Similar to 
the aforementioned lump-sum payment, same-sex couples in New 
York may face tax implications concerning the payment and receipt 
of spousal support.197  There are two ways in which spousal support 
can be structured in New York State.198  One practice is to render 
maintenance payments deductible by the payor and taxable as income 
to the recipient of support.199  The alternative practice is to make the 
income non-deductible for the payor spouse and non-taxable to the 
recipient spouse.200  Both options are available to traditional hetero-
sexual spouses.  However, because DOMA does not recognize same-
 
                                                                                                                                       
191 26 U.S.C. § 1041(a). 
192 Wrubel, supra note 190. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 26 U.S.C. § 102 (2006); see also Wrubel, supra note 190 (noting the absence of legal 
benefits and protections available to same-sex spouses at the federal level). 
196 Wrubel, supra note 190. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
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sex marriages, and thus same-sex divorce, same-sex spouses will not 
have the benefit of choosing the structure of their maintenance pay-
ments. 201 The IRS can and will ignore any judgment of divorce, or 
otherwise valid settlement agreement that attempts to apply standard 
heterosexual spousal tax protections to a same-sex divorce.202 
One final issue is the question of how courts presiding over 
same-sex divorces will deal with the fact that many couples have 
been sharing a home, building a life, and acquiring de facto joint as-
sets, in some instances, decades before the Marriage Equality Act 
passed in 2011.  Pursuant to DRL Section 236(b), the court shall con-
sider the duration and/or length of the parties’ marriage when equita-
bly distributing property in a matrimonial action.203  Because 
“[c]ourts divvy up property very differently when a couple has been 
together two years as opposed to 20,” same-sex couples who were 
denied the right to marry prior to 2011, may be at a disadvantage 
when it comes to equitable distribution awards.204  One author poign-
antly asks the question: “But if a couple has been together for a dec-
ade before gay marriage was legal, how many years should count?”205  
This may pose a serious problem for judges who would be placed in a 
position to decide, presumably based upon the credibility of testimo-
ny, how long a “maritalesque” relationship existed amongst the liti-
gants prior to their official marriage ceremony.  It is the position of 
this author that judges may have to perform this function to protect 
the parties from unjust enrichment while preserving their respective 
property interests.  However, it remains to be seen what justice will 
require. 
V. CONCLUSION 
New York’s domestic relations laws have experienced a tre-
 
                                                                                                                                       
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 236(b) (enumerating the factors the court must consider in 
employing equitable distribution of the marital property). 
204 Tovia Smith, Gay Divorce a Higher Hurdle than Marriage, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO 
(July 20, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/07/20/137674268/gay-divorce-a-higher-hurdle-
than-marriage (commenting on the potential disparity in equitable distribution for couples 
that have been together for a decade or more, but only legally married since the passage of 
the law in 2011). 
205 Id. 
34
Touro Law Review, Vol. 29 [2013], No. 2, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss2/10
2013] MODERN REFORMATION 423 
 
mendous amount of reformation within the past two years.206  On the 
one hand, New York finally entered the modern world by formally 
making no-fault the official divorce system of the United States.207  
On the other hand, the State very boldly adopted the ultra-progressive 
policy of not only recognizing but now solemnizing, same-sex mar-
riage through the momentous enactment of the Marriage Equality 
Act.208  It is this author’s position that the two domestic relations re-
forms can be reconciled as a part of a much-needed overhaul of the 
State’s laws concerning the social and familial arenas.  This Com-
ment stands for the proposition that both laws, as enacted, are good 
faith attempts by the State of New York to bring about social equality 
and acceptance, while attempting to lessen the emotional and finan-
cial hardships associated with the dissolution of marital unions.  
Thus, the social impact of these two laws is tantamount to the im-
portance of their legal implications to the people of New York. 
Although the recent reform of New York’s matrimonial law 
in adopting no-fault divorce may not be the ultimate solution to a 
couple’s marital discontentment, it is likely the best solution for the 
time being and, is no doubt, a good place to start.  There is a reason 
that all other forty-nine states have adopted similar no-fault provi-
sions well before New York got on the bandwagon,209 and that is be-
cause battling over grounds only stokes the flames of anguished 
spouses who want a way out.210  Perhaps the State was holding onto 
the notion that no-fault would provide too much ease for divorce 
without enough contemplation or incentive to work on the marriage 
and preserve the sanctity of the family setting.211  Although this is a 
valid concern, it is not very probable that the old fault-system was 
 
                                                                                                                                       
206 See Domestic Relations Law—No Fault Divorce, ch. 384, sec. 3890-A, 2010 N.Y. 
Sess. Laws (McKinney) (codified as amended N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1)(7)); see also 
Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Law News of N.Y. (McKinney) (codified as 
amended N.Y. DOM. REL. §§ 10-a, 10-b, 11, 13 (McKinney 2012)). 
207 See Domestic Relations Law—No Fault Divorce, ch. 384, sec. 3890-A, 2010 N.Y. 
Sess. Laws (McKinney) (codified as amended N.Y. DOM. REL. § 170 (1) (7) (McKinney 
2010)). 
208 See Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Sess. Law News of N.Y. (McKinney) 
(codified as amended N.Y. DOM. REL. §§ 10-a, 10-b, 11, 13 (McKinney 2012)). 
209 South Dakota was actually the second-to-last state to adopt no-fault divorce in 1985, 
nearly twenty-five years before New York would succumb to the vast preference for no-fault 
legislation.  Guidice, supra note 19, at 788-89. 
210 See Miller, supra note 76. 
211 See DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 10, at 560. 
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benefiting family unity any more than a no-fault legislative enact-
ment does.  Therefore, society is not benefited when the State makes 
divorces more difficult to obtain by requiring an allegation of fault 
before one can be granted freedom from an unsalvageable marriage.  
Feuding spouses make for an unstable home environment, and chil-
dren are often the true victims of parents who cannot get along.212  
Although no-fault divorce cannot entirely remove the sting from di-
vorce, it might help parties look past the issue of “fault” and focus on 
a future in which they can move forward toward a less contentious-
based life. 
Finally, the advent of the Marriage Equality Act, although so-
cially just and well intentioned, has also brought about much uncer-
tainty within the realm of New York’s domestic relations laws.213  So 
long as DOMA remains the controlling federal law, capable of super-
seding state recognition of same-sex marriages, such spouses will be 
legal unequals under the eyes of the federal law.214  This inequality 
will undoubtedly continue to bring about a plethora of hardships that 
same-sex spouses must face when filing for divorce.215  The only 
remedy to be used for the time being is the amalgamation of written 
agreements establishing the parties’ respective rights prior to the time 
that the couple enters into a formal union.216  This means that a pru-
dent couple should seek legal counsel prior to marriage to determine 
their legal rights and allow them to make an informed decision.217  
This may be a cynical way of looking at things, but given the wide-
 
                                                                                                                                       
212 See Miller, supra note 76. 
213 See Marriage Equality for Same-Sex Couples in New York, LAMBDA LEGAL 
ORGANIZATION, http://data.lambdalegal.org/publications/downloads/fs_marriage-equality-
same-sex-couples-ny.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (“[Marriage] is a rapidly evolving legal 
area with much uncertainity.”). 
214 See Wrubel, supra note 190 (“According to DOMA, any and all federal benefits avail-
able to a ‘spouse’ were limited to heterosexual couples; accordingly, legally married same-
sex couples are prohibited from availing themselves of any federally granted benefits that are 
available to their heterosexual counterparts.”). 
215 See generally Cohen et al., supra note 157 (enumerating the various problems same-
sex spouses will face under state law as a result of the presence of DOMA). 
216 See id.; see also Wrubel, supra note 190 (“[U]ntil DOMA is repealed, practitioners 
must continue to utilize the remedies previously developed for the dissolution of same-sex 
relationships (when marriage was unavailable to same-sex couples) to overcome the existing 
federally sanctioned discrimination.”). 
217 See Cohen et al., supra note 157 (“[S]amesex married couples must inform themselves 
about the myriad gaps in their legal rights and exercise due diligence in planning their lives 
together.”). 
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ranged implications of DOMA, same-sex couples must be educated 
about their legal rights, so that they may best understand any ramifi-
cations that may result from a marriage that ultimately ends in di-
vorce. 
One possible solution that may be crucial to the preservation 
of same-sex spouses’ rights in the event of divorce is the use of pre-
nuptial agreements, which can enumerate the parties’ rights in the 
event that the relationship runs its course.218  A pre-nuptial agreement 
could be a useful tool so that “parties to a same-sex marriage may 
chart out their own financial futures while at the same time protecting 
themselves from the vagaries of the present highly uncertain legal 
environment.”219  Furthermore, these agreements could lay out the 
groundwork for issues concerning “distribution of property, mainte-
nance and inheritance rights.”220  Same-sex couples are also advised 
to express via written pre-nuptial agreements their intended rights in 
relation to any children born of the marriage.221  Couples should note 
that a court possesses the authority to supersede any such agreement 
in its role as “parens patriae” in order to maintain the best interests 
of the child standard in regard to custody and support issues.222  One 
attorney has also intelligently suggested that same-sex couples should 
form an agreement providing: 
[T]hat neither spouse would move to a state with a 
state DOMA without the written consent of the other 
spouse, or that, if they are residing in a state that will 
not grant divorces to same-sex couples, they will take 
certain specified steps to entitle them to invoke the di-
vorce jurisdiction of New York, or of another speci-
fied state that will adjudicate their divorce.223 
It is highly recommended that same-sex couples draft 
healthcare proxies for themselves and their children in the event that 
 
                                                                                                                                       
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 Daniel Clement, Four Tips to Protect Same-Sex Married Couples in New York, NEW 
YORK DIVORCE REPORT BLOG (Dec. 14, 2011), http://divorce.clementlaw.com/marriage/four-
tips-to-protect-same-sex-married-couples-in-new-york/ (giving same-sex couples four sim-
ple legal tips that will help protect their rights). 





Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
426 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
 
they travel to a mini-DOMA jurisdiction that may not recognize the 
validity of the marriage, and therefore spousal or parental rights asso-
ciated with that union.224  As previously mentioned in this Comment, 
the non-biological parent of a child should always complete a second-
parent adoption to protect the parent if the marriage fails and the bio-
logical parent challenges the other spouse’s parenting rights.225  Fi-
nally, in order to predetermine that one’s same-sex spouse can inherit 
the estate of the deceased spouse, same-sex couples should draft a 
will and/or other trust and estate documents to ensure that their wish-
es are complied with, no matter the jurisdiction.226 
Ultimately, these new laws will greatly impact the way cou-
ples reach an end to their marriages.  Divorce is not the most pleasant 
of topics but is an unfortunate reality in our modern world, and thus, 
it requires modern solutions.  Just as marriage is currently available 
to all couples residing in New York, so, too, is divorce.  Only time 
will tell what additional amendments must be made to better accom-
modate divorce litigants as they forge their way through the domestic 
relations court system.  However, it is this author’s hope that this 
Comment has served to inform the legal community, and those af-
fected by its laws, as to the present state of divorce reform and offer a 




                                                                                                                                       
224 See Clement, supra note 221 (“To ensure that your spouse will be entitled to your med-
ical information and to make medical decisions should you be unable, provide him/her with 
a health care proxy.”). 
225 Id. (“Should the non-biological parent (or in the case of adoptive children, the non-
adoptive parent) be not deemed the ‘legal’ parent of a child, the party could be denied par-
enting time, custody or visitation, with children of the relationship.”). 
226 See id. (“In order to ensure that your spouse inherits from you, no matter your jurisdic-
tion, draft a will and all necessary trust documents to ensure that your wishes are respected 
in the event of your death.”). 
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